Reflections on Some Aspects of the Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under the Nigerian 1979 And 1999 Constitutions: One or More High Court (S)? by Osipitan, Taiwo & Odusote, Abiodun
JURIDICA 
 5 
Public Law 
 
Reflections on Some Aspects of the 
Jurisdiction of the Federal High Court 
under the Nigerian 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions: One or More High Courts? 
 
Taiwo OSIPTAN1, Abiodun ODUSOTE2 
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Nigeria. The central issues in the jurisdictional conflicts under CFRN are two-fold. They are: whether 
the Federal High Court has jurisdiction in all cases involving the Federal Government or any of its 
agencies, irrespective of the subject matter of the case or whether the jurisdiction conferred on the 
Federal High Court is exclusive to the Court or is concurrently shared with other High Courts. A 
related problem is whether the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court is restricted to those 
specific causes, listed in Section 251 or extends to all matters within the legislative competence of the 
National Assembly. The interpretation and application of this provision have generated, and continues 
to generate the jurisdictional crisis. The conflicts have further deepened with the recognition of the 
National Industrial Court as a Court of co-ordinate status as the Federal and State High Courts. This 
paper examines some of the jurisdictional conflicts which have arisen in the jurisprudence of these 
courts. The problems associated with adoption of dual system of High Courts are thereafter examined. 
The paper ends with a discourse on the desirability of one or two or three High Courts within the 
Nigerian judicial system. The paper concludes that the existence of three High Courts within the 
Nation’s judicature raises question of desirability or otherwise of more than one High Court in a 
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1. Introduction 
Nigeria attained a full Federal status in 1954 as a result of the creation of Regional 
Governments and a Central Government. Federal principles were introduced into 
the Nation’s Judicial System in 1973 when the defunct Federal Revenue Court was 
established. Prior to the establishment of the Court, Regional and State Courts 
exercised jurisdiction over all causes and matters. The Revenue Court was 
established against the background, of the need to determine “with dispatch” cases 
involving the revenue of the Federal Government, which the State High Courts 
were “too tardy” in dealing with. It is noteworthy, that the Court was established 
in spite of opposition and criticisms which greeted the proposal for its 
establishment. After its establishment attempts were made to abolish the Court. 
There have also been efforts to either reduce or expand the jurisdiction of the 
Court. For example, an attempt to expand the scope of the court’s jurisdiction to 
dispute between a bank and its Customer in pure Banking transaction-related 
dispute was rightly rejected by the Supreme Court in Jammal Steel Structures v. 
ACB Ltd. (1973)1 ALL NLR (Part 1) at P. 222; 1973 II SC P. 77. It is gratifying 
that the Court survived the onslaught of advocates of its abolition. Under the 1979 
Constitution, the Court was renamed Federal High Court. The Federal High Court 
inherited the jurisdiction of the defunct Federal Revenue Court. The renaming of 
the Court, subsequently resulted in the attempt to expand the scope of its 
jurisdiction beyond Federal Government’s Revenue Matters to causes involving the 
Federal Government and its Agencies, as well as Matters within legislative 
competence of the National Assembly. These attempts resulted in some 
jurisdictional crisis. Since its establishment there has been one controversy or the 
other on the court’s jurisdiction. The jurisdictional relationship of the Federal and 
State High Court has attracted endless controversies (Osipitan, 1983). There are 
currently High Courts of Co-ordinate jurisdictions under the 1999 Constitution as 
amended. These are: Federal High Court, the National Industrial Court and the 
State High Courts/High Court of Federal Capital Territory. The existence of these 
Court has generated and will continue to generate jurisdictional conflicts. 
(Ogungbe, 1992; Dinakin, 1990) 
The objective of this paper is to examine some of the jurisdictional conflicts which 
have arisen as a result of the establishment of the Federal High Court. This paper 
focuses on aspects of the court’s jurisdiction with respect to some Causes involving 
Federal Government and its Agencies. The jurisdiction of the Federal High Court 
under Section 251(1),(P),(Q),(R) & (S) and 251(2) & (3) are critically x-rayed 
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below. These provisions are examined against the backdrop of decisions of the 
Court of Appeal and the apex Court. The problems associated with adoption of 
dual system of High Courts are thereafter examined. The paper ends with a 
discourse on the desirability of one or two or three High Courts within our judicial 
system. The jurisdictional conflicts are examined below in two phases. These are 
the conflicts under the 1979 Constitution and the post 1979 Constitution era. The 
provisions of the Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree No. 107 of 
1993 and the present 1999 Constitution as interpreted by the Courts are critically 
examined. The definition of jurisdiction, its nature and fundamental importance, 
are necessary foundation in the discussion on the various jurisdictional conflicts. 
These preliminary issues are examined below. 
 
2. Nature, Importance and Definition of Jurisdiction 
It is trite, that there is no universally agreed definition of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
can simply be defined as the power of a court to entertain a suit brought before it 
for adjudication by litigants. Jurisdiction is the foundation of litigation. It is the life 
wire of any Suit. Where there is no jurisdiction, the case is dead on arrival in court. 
In the case of Ogunmokun v Milad of Osun State (1993) 3 NWLR (Pt. 594) 261 at 
265 jurisdiction was defined as “…the basis, foundation and life wire of access to 
court in adjudication under the Nigerian Civil Process.” The term jurisdiction has 
two connotations. In the general sense, it means the abstract right of a court to 
entertain matters before it. In the particular sense, it is the right of the court to 
decide matters litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters presented in the 
formal way for its decision. It is trite, that jurisdiction must be expressly conferred 
by statute. Therefore, there can be no jurisdiction by inference. Clear and express 
words are required to confer jurisdiction on a Court. A Court either has or lacks 
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of a Court can either be an exclusive or 
shared/concurrent jurisdiction. In the former, only the court vested with exclusive 
jurisdiction can entertain a cause. In the latter, more than one Court can deal with a 
cause of action. The jurisdiction of a Court, with respect to a cause can either be 
original or appellate. It can also be supervisory jurisdiction, in the sense that the 
Court is empowered to supervise inferior courts and tribunals through the use of 
prerogative powers/reliefs of mandamus, prohibitions and mandamus. All superior 
courts of record have inherent jurisdiction. However, inherent jurisdiction is neither 
a substantive nor distinct jurisdiction. It is not capable of giving rise to a separate 
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jurisdiction. It is a supplementary jurisdiction exercised by the Court in the 
exercise of its substantive jurisdiction.  
There is also ancillary jurisdiction. A Court which has substantive jurisdiction may 
be conferred with ancillary jurisdiction over matters which are ordinarily within the 
jurisdiction of another Court. A ready example is the provision of the 1999 
Constitution, which gives State High Court ancillary jurisdiction over Federal 
Causes, which arise in the course of exercising jurisdiction over causes within its 
substantive jurisdiction, under the law of a State. Substantive jurisdiction should 
also be distinguished from procedural jurisdiction. The former is traceable to either 
the constitution or a Law passed by the legislature. The latter is usually rooted in 
the rules of Court and practice direction. The latter is also adjectival, in the sense 
that it is a rule of practice and procedure, while it is possible to waive the latter, in 
the sense that parties can by consent waive non-compliance with its requirements, 
the former is not waive-able. There is also territorial jurisdiction, which often 
mandates the courts in deciding propriety of venue to sue either between Nigeria 
and another country or between one state of the Nigerian Federation and another 
state to have regards to choice of jurisdiction rules under conflict of laws whether 
at common law or under extant statutes. The guidelines for determining a Court’s 
jurisdiction was laid down by the Apex Court in Tukur v Govt. of Gongola State 
(1989) 2 NWLR (Pt. 117) p. 517. The fundamental importance of jurisdiction can 
be appreciated against the backdrop of it being the special cord, blood and life of 
litigation. It is the foundation on which every other processes or proceeding rests. 
Without jurisdiction, litigants, lawyers, court officials and judicial, officers, 
involved in a particular case will labour in vain. A case which supports the 
fundamental importance of jurisdiction is the case of Jeric Nigeria Limited v. 
Union Bank of Nigeria PLC (2000) 12 SC (Pt. II) 133 at 137 in that case it was 
held that:  
There is no doubt that in our adversary system of adjudication the question of 
jurisdiction is very fundamental. In fact it is so fundamental that the adjudicating 
Court should determine the issue first before starting any proceedings. And if the 
Court proceeded and it was found that the Court had no jurisdiction in the matter 
all the proceedings however will conducted amount to nothing and are a nullity. It 
is also trite Law, that the issue of jurisdiction can be raised at any time by a party 
even on appeal in the Supreme Court as was done in this Case. 
Finally, where a Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain a cause, it should 
ordinarily strike out the Suit as opposed to its outright dismissal. Section 22 of the 
JURIDICA 
 9 
Federal High Act empowers the Court to transfer a case which is not within its 
jurisdiction to a State High Court. The provision has attracted two divergent views. 
There are those who endorse the power to transfer a Suit to State High Court where 
the Federal High Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction. The other School is of the 
view that transfer of a case is an exercise of judicial power. Consequently, once 
there is no jurisdiction, the Court lacks the power to transfer the Suit to the State or 
any other Court. The Plaintiff must commence a fresh Suit in appropriate Court. 
Antagonists of Section 22 argue against the backdrop of Federal Principles. They 
contend that in a Federation each Federating tier of Government is sovereign 
within its area of competence. Therefore, no sovereign is at liberty to impose 
obligation on another sovereign. Transfer of a case from Federal to State High 
Court is therefore seen as an imposition of duty by a Federal on a State High Court. 
This is antithetical to Federal principles. It suffices to say that the two schools have 
judicial backings. It also suffices to state that the discussion in this paper centers on 
substantive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under the 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions. 
 
3. 1979 Constitution  
Under the 1979 constitution, there were conflicting decisions of the Court of 
Appeal on the subject matter jurisdiction of the Federal High Court over Federal 
causes. This resulted in the then Court of Appeal being unable to properly guide 
the Federal and State High Courts on the issue of jurisdiction. The source of the 
conflict was Section 230(1),(b) of the Constitution. The bone of contention was 
whether the provision conferred immediate or future jurisdiction on the court, with 
respect to matters within the legislative competence of the National Assembly. 
Section 230(1),(b) of 1979 constitution provides: 
Subject to the provisions of the constitution and in addition to such other 
jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly, the 
Federal High Court shall have jurisdiction in such other matters as may be 
prescribed with respect to the National Assembly powers to make Laws.  
In the case of Federal Minister of Internal Affairs & 3 others v Shugaba (1982) 
NCLR 915, the Respondent instituted the suit at the Borno State High Court 
against the President of Nigeria and the other officials of the Federal Government. 
The Suit was to enforce his right as a Citizen of Nigeria to move about within 
Nigeria without being hindered and his right as a Nigeria not to be excluded from 
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Nigeria through a deportation order. Citizenship was evidently within the 
legislative competence of the National Assembly by virtue of being an item on the 
Exclusive Legislative List. Against this backdrop, the Appellants challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Borno State High Court to entertain the Suit. Appellants argued 
that causes on Exclusive Legislative List are triable by Federal High Court. The 
jurisdiction of the State High, to entertain an action instituted against agents of the 
Federal Government was also questioned by the Appellants. The Kaduna division 
of the Court of Appeal (by a majority decision) held that the State High Court had 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit, notwithstanding that the Defendants are Agents of 
Federal Government and that Citizenship which was a cause of action, was within 
the exclusive legislative list of the National Assembly under the 1979 Constitution. 
A contrary decision was arrived at by Lagos judicial division of the Court of 
Appeal in the case of Eze v. Republic (1987) NWLR (Pt. 51) 506. The issue in that 
case was whether it was the Federal or State High Court which has jurisdiction to 
try the Respondent who had been arraigned for unlawful importation and 
possession of fire arms. The Court held that because arms, ammunitions and 
explosives were listed on the Exclusive Legislative List of the 1979 Constitution, 
the Federal High Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the charge. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the Court held that the Federal High Court could not entertain a 
case for wrongful possession of firearms because s. 230(2) only permitted the 
Federal High Court to entertain criminal law derivations of the ‘then few federal 
items’ listed in s. 230(1). In the case of National Assembly v Tony Momoh (1982), 
the Lagos Division of the Court of Appeal upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court in an action for the enforcement of fundamental right which 
was instituted against the Senate of the National Assembly. The case was decided 
on the basis of Federal principles, namely, that in a Federation each Government is 
sovereign and no sovereign will exercise jurisdiction over another unless there is 
submission to jurisdiction. No appeal was filed against the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in the Shugaba’s case. Therefore, the Supreme Court did not have the 
opportunity of testing its correctness or otherwise.  
The attempt in the case of Dr. Olu Onagoruwa v President of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (1982) to have the case stated to the Supreme Court in order to resolve 
the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal on the issue of jurisdiction was 
aborted by the Lagos division of the Court of Appeal which held that there was no 
legal basis for reference to the Supreme Court. It was until the case of Bronik 
Motors Ltd v WEMA Bank Ltd. (1983), and subsequent decision in Savannah Bank 
Ltd v PAN Atlantic Shipping Agencies Limited (1987) that the Supreme Court was 
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opportune to offer proper guidance on the proper interpretation of Section 
230(1),(b) and 236(1) of the 1979 Constitution which were the sources of the 
conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal on the issues of jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court. Prior to the above cases, conflicting decisions of the Court of 
Appeal on the jurisdiction of Federal High Court gave Federal and State High 
Courts the liberty to pick and choose which of the conflicting decisions of the 
Court of Appeal to follow. Hear the lamentation of Eso J.S.C of blessed memory in 
Bronik Motors case: 
The Federal Court of Appeal has for sometimes now given conflicting decisions on 
the issue of jurisdiction and this has left the State High Courts which should in lieu 
of the decision of this Court be guided by the Federal Court of Appeal. The States 
and Federal High Courts have as a result thereof been at large on the issue, each 
judge therein taking its own decision on which of the conflicting decisions of the 
Federal Court of Appeal to follow (1983) 6 SC. 
Adenekan Ademola, JCA reminded the High Courts of their right to pick and 
choose which of the conflicting decisions to follow when he said:  
There are two new conflicting decisions of this Court on the issue of jurisdiction. 
The State and Federal High Courts are free to choose which of the decisions they 
would follow. This situation would be with us for sometime in the hope that the 
situation would give rise to a quick decision by the Supreme Court on the matter.  
Jinadu. J sitting at the Lagos Judicial division of the High Court of Lagos State in 
the case of Dele Giwa v I.G.P. (1982) reviewed the conflicting decisions in 
Shugaba and Tony Momoh cases and rightly concluded, that he had the right to 
pick which of the conflicting decisions of the Court of Appeal he would follow. He 
followed the Shugaba’s case and held that he had the right, to entertain the case of 
the plaintiff despite the fact that the defendant was a Federal Agent. It is gratifying, 
that in the Bronik Motor’s case, the Supreme Court held that contrary to the 
decision of the Lagos division of the Court of Appeal, section 230(1),(b) of 1979 
constitution did not confer immediate jurisdiction on the Federal High Court with 
respect to causes or matters within the legislative competence of the National 
Assembly. Section 230(1),(b) was upheld as a provision which enabled the 
National Assembly to in future pass legislation conferring jurisdiction on the 
Federal High Court in respect of causes within the legislative competence of the 
National Assembly. In effect, Federal High Court was to remain a Court of Limited 
original jurisdiction. In the case of Savannah v Pan Atlantic Shipping Agencies Ltd 
(1987) the Supreme Court went a step further, when it held that the jurisdiction of 
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the Federal High Court under the 1979 constitution and the enabling Law was non-
exclusive, consequently whatever jurisdiction was conferred on the Federal High 
Court was to be shared concurrently with the State High Court whose unlimited 
jurisdiction under Section 236(1) of the 1979 Constitution was upheld by the 
Supreme Court. 
The questions which greeted the decision of the apex court in the Pan Atlantic 
Shipping Agencies Case was why have a Federal High Court, if all its jurisdiction 
are also shared concurrently with the State High Court? The implication of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in the above case is that while all jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court are within the unlimited jurisdiction of State High Court, none 
of the jurisdiction of the State High court was brought within the scope of the 
limited jurisdiction of the Federal High Court by the Supreme Court. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in the Pan Atlantic Shipping Agency Case evidently threatened the 
existence of the Federal High Court to its foundation. The case attracted criticisms 
and praises simultaneously. Osipitan (1987) reasoned that not only was the 
decision patently wrong, it amounted to an act of judicial legislation. The 
opportunity to revisit and reverse the uncomfortable decision of the Supreme Court 
in the case arose in 1993 when the Constitution (suspension and modification) 
Decree No. 103 of 1993 was enacted. That Law confirmed the exclusivity of 
jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court. It also specifically spelt out the 
expanded jurisdiction of Federal High Court.  
  
4. 1999 Constitution  
Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution restates the exclusive jurisdiction conferred 
on the Federal High Court by Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree 
No. 107 of 1993. These are the provisions through which the jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court was expanded beyond causes dealing with Federal Government 
Revenue, Banking and other Fiscal Measures and Admiralty as conferred on the 
Court by its enabling Law. The framers of these provisions had hoped that all the 
controversies on the scope of the Federal Jurisdiction, of the Federal High and the 
exclusivity of the Court’s Jurisdiction would be rested. Regrettably, these 
provisions have fostered the development of another phase of jurisdictional tussle 
between the States and Federal High Courts. The relevant provisions of the 1999 
Constitution which are in pari-materia with the provisions of the Constitution 
(suspension and modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993 examined in this paper are: 
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251(1) Notwith standing anything to the contrary contained in this constitution 
and in addition to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by an Act of 
the National Assembly the Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction 
to the exclusion of any other Court in Civil causes and matters.   
(p) The administration or management and control of the Federal Government 
or any of its agencies. 
(q) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the operation and 
interpretation of this constitution in so far as it affects the Federal Government or 
any of its agencies. 
(r) Any action or proceeding for a declaration or injunction affecting the 
validity of any executive or administrative action or decision by the Federal 
Government or any of its agencies; and 
(s) Such other jurisdiction Civil or Criminal and whether to the exclusion of any 
other Court or not as may be conferred upon it by an Act of the National Assembly 
provided that nothing in the provisions of paragraph (p),(q) and (r), of this 
subsection shall prevent a person from seeking redress against the Federal 
Government or any of its agencies in any action for damages injunction or specific 
performance where the action is based on any enactment, Law or equity. 
Section 251(2)  The Federal High Court shall have and exercise jurisdiction and 
power in respect of treason, treasonable felony and allied offences. 
251(3) The Federal High Court shall also have and exercise jurisdiction and 
powers in respect of Criminal Cases and matter in respect of which jurisdiction is 
conferred by sub-section (1) of this Section.” 
The interpretation and application of the above provisions have generated, are still 
generating and would continue to generate the jurisdictional crisis. The conflicts 
would be further deepened with the recent recognition of the National Industrial 
Court as a Court of co-ordinate status as the Federal and State High Court. The 
National Industrial Court not only has exclusive jurisdiction over Labour Law 
issues and industrial relations, it is also vested with jurisdiction to try issues of 
infraction of fundamental rights which arise from Industrial/Labour Law related 
disputes. 
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5. Federal Agencies 
In paragraph (p),(q),(r), and (s) of Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution, the 
phrase Federal Government or any of its agencies” is a recurring decimal. There 
are evidently three tiers of government recognized by the Constitution. These are 
Federal, State and Local Governments. It is evidently not difficult to identify 
Federal Government as the Central Government with its capital located at the 
Federal Capital Territory Abuja. While identification of Federal Government 
presents no difficulty, this cannot be said of identification of agencies of the 
Federal Government. The importance of indentifying whose agency or agent a 
body or person is, is of fundamental importance for the purpose of deciding 
jurisdiction of the Federal and State High Courts. This is because the provisions of 
Section 251(1),(p),(q),(r) & (s) can only be activated in favour of Federal High 
Court’s jurisdiction, where the Agency that is suing or being sued (provided the 
subject matter of the action falls within Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution) is 
an agency of the Federal Government. Therefore, where the agency or official 
suing or sued is not an agency of Federal Government or did not act as agency of 
the Federal Government at the relevant time which resulted in the cause of action, 
the Federal High Court will lack jurisdiction to entertain the Suit under Section 
251(p),(q),(r) & (s). 
Take the case of Okoroma v Uba (1999) as a case study. The issue was whether a 
Police Officer who was implementing the directive of the State Governor acted as 
an agent of the State or Federal Government. The question that arose in the course 
of determining it was whether it is the State or Federal High Court that had 
Jurisdiction over the dispute. It was held by the Court of Appeal that the Police 
Officer who implemented the directive of a State Governor was not acting as an 
Agent of the Federal Government. He acted as the agent of the State Government. 
Consequently, State and not Federal High Court, was the proper forum to litigate 
the cause of action against such a police officer. The Court reasoned thus: 
A police officer is capable of enjoying dual status when he is complying with the 
directions of the Governor of a State with respect to maintaining and securing 
public safety and public order within the state, he is an agent of the state and not an 
agent of the Federal Government even though he is the servant of the Federal 
Government. On the other hand, where he is complying with the directions of the 
President in maintain and securing public safety and public order issued to the 
Inspector General of Police, then he is acting as an Agent of the Federal 
Government. In the instant case, the 2nd – 6th Respondents were securing public 
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safety, public order in Enugu State either on the special or general directions of the 
Governor of the state and were for that purpose agents of the state. Military 
Administrator of Kwara State v Lafiagi (1998) 7 NWLR (Pt. 557)213. 
In the above case, the Court further held that “on denotative meaning of “agencies” 
under section 230 of the Constitution (suspension and modification) Decree 107 of 
1993 –The word “agencies” used in Section 203(1),(q),(r) and (s) of the 
constitution (Suspension and modification). Decree 107 of 1993 denotes the 
Federal Government establishments or organs through or by which the Federal 
Government carries out its functions. It has consequently been held that the 
Independent Electoral Commission, AD v. INEC (2004), a University, University of 
Abuja v. Ologe (1996) and Central Bank of Nigeria are all agencies of the Federal 
Government. Actions by or against these institutions must therefore be commenced 
in the Federal High Court. However, our Appellate Courts are unprepared to hold 
that a Limited Liability Company in which the Federal Government has controlling 
shares is an agency of the Federal Government. And if we may ask is INEC which 
conducts election into elective positions at Federal and State level an agency of the 
Federal Government, with the result those actions by or against the Commission 
should commence in Federal High Court? The name INEC suggests that it is 
conceived as an independent body by virtue of section 158 of the Constitution. The 
Commission is neither a Federal nor a State agency. INEC is a National agency 
with power to conduct elections throughout the Federation. It is therefore not an 
agency of the Federal Government. Peter-Odili JSC expressed a contrary opinion in 
Salim v Congress for Progressive Change (2013) at p. 16, he stated that: “the 
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC) is an agency of the Federal 
Government”. He further held that in pre-election matters both the Federal High 
Court and States High Court have jurisdictions to try the matter by virtue of S. 87 
(9) of the Electoral Act 2011. Peter-Odili JSC expressed the view that if not for the 
Electoral Act, the Federal High Court would have had exclusive jurisdiction By 
virtue of Section 153, INEC is an agency established for the federation.  
The central issues in the jurisdictional conflicts under the 1999 Constitution are 
two-fold. They are whether the Federal High Court has jurisdiction in all cases 
involving the Federal Government or any of its agencies, irrespective of the subject 
matter of the case or whether the jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court 
is exclusive to the Court or is concurrently shared with other High Court. A related 
problem is whether, the jurisdiction conferred on the Court is restricted to those 
specific causes, listed in Section 251 or extends to all matters within the legislative 
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competence of the National Assembly. The word “notwithstanding” which appears 
in Section 251(1) and the words “subject to” which appears in Section 272 of the 
Constitution have been rightly interpreted as conferring exclusive jurisdiction on 
the Federal High Court in civil cases in respect of matters enumerated in Section 
251(1) of the 1999 Constitution. Section 230(1),(q),(r) and (s) of 1979 Constitution 
as amended by Decree 107 of 1993 was tested in the case of NEPA v Edegbero 
(2002). The Respondents who were staff of the defunct NEPA had their 
employment terminated. They challenged the Respondent’s decision to terminate 
their employment. The High Court of Niger State was forum of their choice for 
instituting the action. The case was tried. In the final address, Appellants’ Counsel 
argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the action was against an agency 
of Federal Government. The issue of jurisdiction consequently occupied center 
stage in the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Ogundare J.S.C, of 
blessed memory, was not in doubt that the issue at stake centered on party 
jurisdiction. The result was that once one of the parties is the Federal Government 
or any of its agencies, the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction regardless 
of the subject matter of the Suit (cause of action). Hon. Justice Tobi in his 
supporting judgment, while agreeing that the cause of action fell within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court adopted a different approach. His 
Lordship insisted that not only must the party be a Federal Agency, the subject-
matter of the Suit, must be one of the causes listed in Section 251(1) of the 
Constitution. Interestingly, both Ogundare’s endorsement of party jurisdiction and 
Tobi’s party and subject-matter jurisdiction are supported by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. The result is that lawyers and Judges of the 
High and Appellate Courts will until the conflicts are settled by the Supreme Court 
pick and choose which of the conflicting views to embrace. In the case of 
Inegbedion v Dr. Selo-Ojemen (2013), the causes of action were negligence, 
defamation and breach of doctor/patient relationship. One of the parties (2nd 
Respondent) was admittedly an agency of the Federal Government. The action was 
instituted in the Ekpoma Division of the High Court of Edo State. The Respondent 
challenged the jurisdiction of the High Court of Edo State to entertain the suit 
which was instituted against an agency of Federal Government. The objection was 
sustained by the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. Alagoa, JSC held that: 
The effect of Paragraph (p),(q) and (r) of Section 251(1) of the 1999 Constitution is 
to vest exclusive jurisdiction on the Federal High Court over all civil causes and 
matters in which the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party. See 
NEPA v Edegbero (2002) 103 LRCN 2280 at 2281-2282; (2002) 18 NWLR 
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(Pt.798) 79 Muhammad JSC also lent his weight to subject-matter jurisdiction 
when he held that: 
The law is unequivocally stated by the 1999 Constitution (as amended) in Section 
251(p),(q),(r) and by this court that where in a matter, one of the parties is the 
Federal Government or any of its agencies, it is only the Federal High Court that 
has exclusive jurisdiction. A State High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain such 
matter. See NEPA v Edegbero (2002) 18 NWLR 7 (Pt. 789) p. 79. Mohammad JSC 
further stated in Adetayo v Ademola (2010) 38 WRN 79: 
On the face of the provision of the Constitution, it appears that impression has been 
created that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction to the exclusion of all 
other courts in Nigeria in any civil cause or proceedings in which the Federal 
Government or any of its agencies is a party. However, a very close, careful and 
proper interpretation or construction of the provisions would show that this is not 
necessarily the true position. This is because in my view, it is the facts and 
circumstances of each case that determines. The need to examine the parties in the 
litigation as well as the subject matter of the litigation was strongly advised for 
close scrutiny (supra). 
The above decision was also followed by the Court of Appeal in ALI v CBN 
(1997). The exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in disputes involving 
Federal Government or any of its agencies was upheld by the Court of Appeal per 
Ogebe JCA (as he then was) thus: 
In FGN v Oshiomole, Salami JCA upheld the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
High Court to entertain the suit because the Federal Government of Nigeria and 
another functionary are parties to the action. “Ariwoola JC” The proviso in 
paragraphs (r) and (s) do not derogate from the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on 
the Federal High Court. It is quite clear from the claims of the appellant before the 
trial court that the substance of his claim was for unlawful dismissal. The question 
of breach of his constitutional right is merely ancillary. Assuming therefore (but 
not holding) that the State High Court may have jurisdiction to entertain the main 
claim of unlawful dismissal which entirely has to do with the administration or the 
management and control of a Federal agency. Since the Federal High Court has 
jurisdiction to entertain both aspects of the claim, constitutional and contractual, it 
is clear that the proper court to entertain this matter is the Federal High Court and 
not the State High Court. 
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A (as he then was) endorsed party jurisdiction as laid down in NEPA v Edegbero 
case in Ministry, Works & Housing v Shittu (2007). The case dealt with title to land 
which ordinarily, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State High Court by 
virtue of Section 39(1) of the Land Use Act. Notwithstanding, the fact that Land 
tenure and title to Land are not part of the jurisdiction vested in the Federal High 
Court, it was held that on account of the joinder of agency of Federal Government 
as a party to the Suit, the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal 
High Court. According to his Lordship: 
It must be taken as settled therefore by virtue of section 251(1) of 1999 
Constitution, where the Federal Government or any of its agencies is a party to a 
suit it is not the nature of the claim as endorsed on the writ of summons or averred 
in the statement of claim that determines whether or not the State High Court has 
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter. The only Court vested with jurisdiction on 
such matters as listed in the Constitution is the Federal High Court of Nigeria. 
The above case is in conflict with the decision in Achebe v Nwosu (2013) where it 
was held that Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction over disputes on title to land. 
The Court also held that it is immaterial that Federal Government or any of its 
agencies was a party to the Suit. After holding that Federal High Court lacks 
jurisdiction over title to land, Olagunju JCA observed and counseled thus: 
- subsection 230(1) of the Constitution does not contain blanket provision that any 
suit against Federal Government or any of its agencies must be heard by only the 
Federal High Court regardless of the subject-matter.” This calls to mind similar 
caution to the Federal High Court in Mandara v A.G Federation (Supra) at page 
33, over the inordinate disposition of that Court to assume jurisdiction over any 
matter on the slightest pretext as long as such matter is embossed with the logo of 
the Federal Government or any of its agencies. It cannot be over-emphasised, the 
axiom that the anatomy of the Federal High Court like that of an individual should 
not be made to bite off more than it can chew for the good of its digestive system. 
The case of Onuorah v KRPC Ltd (2005) is the authority which supports the 
proposition that where an agency of Federal Government has been sued for breach 
of simple contract, the Federal High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. 
The Appellant, who had contracted to purchase some empty tins from the 
Respondent at an agreed price, sought to prevent breach of the contract by the 
Respondent through mandatory orders of specific performance. A central issue was 
whether he should have sued in Federal or State High Court. It was held, that the 
key issue was the subject matter jurisdiction. Since simple contract is not one of the 
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matters listed in section 251(1) of the constitution, the Federal High Court lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain the case. Akintan JSC (as he then was) held as follows: 
In the instant case, since disputes founded on contracts are not among those 
included in the additional jurisdiction conferred on the Federal High Court, that 
Court therefore had no jurisdiction to entertain the appellant’s claim. The question 
whether the Respondent is a subsidiary or agent of the NNPC or not has no role 
when a consideration of the jurisdiction of the court is being made. This is because, 
as already stated above, the determining factor the court, which in this case, is one 
founded on breach of contract. 
Hon. Justice Niki Tobi (as he then was)  
I am in great difficulty to hold that the Federal High Court is conferred with 
jurisdiction to hear matter of simple contractual relationship between the parties. It 
is my humble view that the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court does not admit 
matters of simple contracts between parties and I venture to say such matters are 
clearly outside the provisions of the enabling decrees interpreted by the Court of 
Appeal. 
Oladipo v Nigeria Customs Service Board (2009) is a very interesting but highly 
disturbing case from the view point of jurisdiction of Federal and State High Court. 
The Appellant’s case was based on trespass to land committed by the Respondent. 
Appellant instituted the first action in Ilorin Judicial Division of Federal High 
Court claiming declaratory, injunctive and monetary reliefs. Learned trial Judge 
suo motu raised the issue of jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to entertain the 
case based on trespass. He called for addresses by Counsel and after the addresses 
the court declined jurisdiction. The Suit was consequently struck out. The 
Appellant subsequently commenced another action based on the same cause in the 
Ilorin division of the High Court of Kwara State. The trial Judge also entertained 
argument on jurisdiction. The court held that on account of reliefs sought against 
an agency of the Federal Government, the proper court to entertain the case is the 
Federal High Court. The appeal by the Appellant was allowed by the Court of 
Appeal which held that the Federal High Court is a Court of enumerated 
jurisdiction. Trespass/title to Land is not one of the jurisdictions conferred on the 
Court under Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. Hon. Justice Nweze concluded 
that: 
The sum total of what I am saying is that notwithstanding that the Respondent 
(Nigeria Customs Service) is admittedly a Federal Agency and so ordinarily comes 
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under the jurisdiction ratione personae of the Federal High Court, the subject 
matter of the Suit not being one of the eighteen matters listed in section 251 (supra) 
is outside the jurisdiction ratione materiae or the subject matter jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court. In effect the lower court was wrong in chasing away the 
Appellant from its hallowed temple  
The position taken by Niki Tobi (as he then was) in NEPA v Edegbero on 
importance of subject matter was endorsed in the recent case of Ahmed v Ahmed, at 
the Supreme Court it was argued that because the 4th Respondent (INEC) is an 
agency of the Federal Government, the Suit notwithstanding its subject-matter is 
triable exclusively by the Federal High Court. In the words of Chukwumah-Eneh 
JSC in the lead Judgment: 
I hold the view also as observed in the above cited case that the provisions of 
Section 251(1),(p),(q) and (r) raise the consideration of both subject matter of the 
cause of action and the parties in the action. In my view, it is not just enough to 
identify and rely on such proposition fact of the 4th Respondent being an agency of 
the Federal Government as sued is conclusive of the issue, in other words without 
adverting to whether the subject matter of the cause of action in the matter also 
comes within the exclusive purview of the Federal High Court to deal with. It 
would be wrong to proceed on that basis alone and hold in conclusion that the 
instant matter is completely within the exclusive ambit of the Federal High Court 
to deal with. What I am otherwise saying here is that to determine the applicability 
of the provisions of the said sub-sections 1(p),(q) and (r) of Section 251 to an 
action. The subject matter of the cause of action which must co-exist have been so 
connected to the action as to bring the action within the purview of the provisions 
of the said Section (i.e. Section 251(1) (supra).  
What amounts to an executive or administrative action has however been defined 
by Nweze, J.C.A in Oladipo v N.C.S.B (supra) thus: 
I take the view that the phrase “executive or administrative action” as employed in 
section 251(1),(r) must have a direct relationship with the management and 
administration of the agency concerned. Hence, an executive action must be an 
action concerned with, or relating to the effectuation of the orders or plans or 
policies of the agency in question. Equally, an administrative action must be an 
action directed towards carrying out the policy of the agency 
The proviso to paragraphs (p),(q),(r) & (s) has capacity to produce and has indeed 
produced conflicting decisions. It reads: 
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-provided that nothing in the provisions at paragraphs (p),(q) and (r) shall prevent a 
person form seeking redress against the Federal Government or any of its agencies 
in an action for damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is 
based on any enactment Law or equity. 
The above proviso is capable of being interpreted as provision which enables a 
litigant to approach another High Court (State High Court) to seek redress against 
the Federal Government or any of its agencies where the cause of action is based 
on damages, injunction or specific performance or based on an enactment. A 
similar proviso in section 251(1),(d) of 1999 Constitution was construed by the 
Court of Appeal, NDIC v Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (1997) and the 
supreme Court in Federal Mortgage Bank v NDIC (1999) as vesting the State and 
Federal High Courts with concurrent jurisdiction in respect of disputes between an 
individual customer and his bank and in respect of transactions between individual 
customer and the Bank. It is also possible, to interpret the proviso as confirming the 
exclusive jurisdiction of Federal High Court to entertain Suits which fall within 
Section 251(1),(p),(q) & (s) and to grant any or all of the enumerated reliefs of 
damages, injunction or specific performance where the action is based on any 
enactment, law or equity. This was the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in 
University of Agriculture, Makurdi v Jack, (200) where the Court of Appeal held: 
The proviso by no means confers State High Courts with any jurisdiction in matters 
provided for under Section 230(1). Rather it only expands the jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court where the action against the Federal Government or any of its 
agencies is for damages, injunction or specific performance and the action is 
founded on some enactment Law or equity. 
Similar view was expressed by Hon. Justice Ogundare in his lead Judgment in 
NEPA v Edegbero, where his Lordship rejected the possibility of the provisio being 
interpreted as conferring of jurisdiction on the State High Court thus: 
-while paragraph(s) talked of actions for declaration or injunction, the proviso 
extended this to actions for damages injunction or specific performance. It did not 
say as the learned trial judge with profound respect appear to read into it that action 
for damage injunction or specific performance against the Federal Government or 
any of its agencies could still come before a State High Court. 
Hopefully, a differently constituted court will not impliedly overrule the decision 
through conflicting pronouncement.  
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6. Criminal Jurisdiction  
It is evident that the Federal High Court exercises Criminal Jurisdiction. By virtue 
of Section 7(3) of its enabling law the Court has been conferred with criminal 
jurisdiction in respect of matters within its civil jurisdiction. Under Section 7(2) & 
(3) of the Federal High Court Act, the Federal High Court has jurisdiction to try 
offences under the criminal and penal codes provided the offences are “in relation 
to offences to which proceedings may be initiated at the instance of the Attorney 
General of the Federation”. 
Under the 1979 Constitution, the issues with the Federal High Court’s criminal 
jurisdiction were also two fold. These are the scope and exclusivity of the Court’s 
jurisdiction. The case of R v Eze endorsed the exclusivity of criminal jurisdiction of 
the Federal High Court with respect to matters in the exclusive legislative list of 
1979 Constitution. In the Eze case it was held by the Court of Appeal that since 
Arms and Ammunitions are contained in exclusive legislative list, the offence of 
unlawful importation/possession of fire arms are triable exclusively by the Federal 
High Court, on Appeal to the Supreme Court the Court of Appeal decision was 
overruled. Section 251(2) & (3) of 1999 Constitution confirm the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court in cases of treason, treasonable felony and 
allied offences. Under section 251(3) the Federal High Court has and is expected to 
exercise jurisdiction and powers in respect of criminal cases and matters in respect 
of which jurisdiction is conferred by sub-section (1) of this section. 
The criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under the 1999 Constitution 
has also generated jurisdictional conflicts. In Okey Nwosu v FRN (2013) the 
Appellant was alleged to have utilized funds belonging to the Bank, of which he 
was the Managing Director, to buy shares in names other than that of the Bank. He 
was arraigned before the Lagos State High Court for stealing the Bank’s money. 
He challenged the jurisdiction of the Lagos State High Court to try him contending 
that the issue in the case was a capital market issue which is triable exclusively by 
the Federal High Court. The Court of Appeal upheld his objection by relying on 
Section 251(2), 251(3) of the 1999 constitution and item 12 of the exclusive 
legislative list of the same constitution to hold that Federal High Court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to try the case. Bage JCA in the lead judgment held: 
No doubt, the pith and substance of the complaint of stealing as evidenced by the 
conversion as instructed into shares concerns a matter of capital issue which is item 
12 of the Exclusive legislative list. By Section 251(1),(3) of the constitution of the 
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Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999 as amended), the Federal High Court to the 
exclusion of any other court is conferred with jurisdiction to entertain matters 
coming within the exclusive legislative list that is matter over which the National 
Assembly can legislate. 
The above decision runs contrary to the decision in Abass v COP (1998) where the 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the Federal High Court was jettisoned by the 
Court of Appeal in favour of shared/concurrent criminal jurisdiction of Federal and 
State High Courts. The Court of Appeal held as follows: 
This is the section that confers criminal jurisdiction on the Federal High Court. The 
words used in the section are clear and unambiguous. They can easily be 
understood through the literal rule of interpretation. They require no importation. 
The legal effect of the section, in my view, is that it confers no exclusive 
jurisdiction on Federal High Court in criminal cases specified therein. In other 
words, criminal matters can concurrently be tried by either the Federal High Court 
or other courts conferred with criminal jurisdiction over the matter in dispute. 
The view was also expressed in the above case that “the issue of exclusivity or 
concurrence of jurisdiction has long been expounded by the Courts”. However, 
contrary to the views, if the signal from the Supreme Court is anything to go by, 
the last is yet to be heard on the exclusivity and non exclusivity of the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. In the recent decision of Bode George v 
FRN, (2013) the Appellant was arraigned for the offence of “contract splitting” 
while he was in office as the chairman of a Federal Agency. Trial took place at the 
Lagos High Court. He was convicted and sentenced along with other accused 
persons. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. On further appeal to 
the Supreme Court, the appeal was allowed principally because contract splitting is 
not an offence contained in any written Law. The conviction was evidently 
contrary to the letters and the spirit of section 36(12) of 1999 Constitution and 
other line of cases which abolished unwritten Criminal Law. In the course of the 
judgment, pronouncements were also made by the apex court to the effect that 
since the Agency involved is a Federal Agency, the High Court of Lagos was 
precluded from trying the case which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Federal High Court to try Mohammed v FRN (2013). According to Ngwuta J.S.C: 
The counts of splitting of contract, if in fact any contract was split, relate to the 
control and management of Federal Government Agency, the Nigerian Ports 
Authority over which the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction. See 
Section 251 of the 1999 Constitution. The Lagos State High Court had no 
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jurisdiction to try the Appellant and his trial, conviction and sentence must be 
declared null and void and I so hold.  
It is hoped that a differently constituted panel of the Supreme Court will not arrive 
at a decision which is contrary to the above decision. 
 
7. One or More High Courts 
The provisions of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions have been examined against the 
backdrop of decided cases in order to demonstrate only one aspect of the 
jurisdictional conflicts. Of course, there are pre-1979 jurisdictional conflicts. There 
are also other aspects of the jurisdictional conflicts ranging from Company law 
related matters to revenue of Federal Government, Banking related cases, 
Insurance matters, scope of Admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal High Court, 
Aviation, Ports and other related issues. There are also conflicting decisions on the 
scope of the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to enforcement of fundamental rights. 
It suffices to acknowledge that prior to the establishment of the defunct Federal 
Revenue Court, there was no jurisdictional conflict. Regional and State Courts 
administered Federal, Regional and State Laws simultaneously. Today, we have 
Federal High Court, State High Court and National Industrial Court. They are all 
courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction. Appeals from these courts go directly either as of 
right or with appropriate leave to the Court of Appeal and thereafter to the Supreme 
Court. 
The existence of three High Courts within the Nation’s judicature raises question of 
desirability or otherwise of more than one High Court in a judicature which has 
only one intermediate Court of Appeal and only one Apex Court which entertains 
appeals from the trial Courts. The existence of the Federal and State High Courts 
can be defended on account of observance of Federal principles in the Federation. 
No such excuse can justify the recent recognition of the National Industrial Court 
as a court of superior record through the 3rd amendment to the Constitution. It is 
our respectful views that avoidable expenses and time are being wasted in the 
pursuit of jurisdictional issues. Virtually all cases, especially criminal cases are 
challenged by the Defendant in Federal and State High Courts for want of 
jurisdiction. The journey to the Supreme Court from the High Court through Court 
of Appeal averages between 10–12 years. It takes such a long time to sort out 
preliminary issue of jurisdiction, before moving to the substantive case, delayed 
denial of justice becomes more evident. It is trite that justice delayed is justice 
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denied. Little wonder, Uwais CJN (as he the then) lamented and counseled thus in 
Amadi v NNPC (2000): 
The chequered history of this case once more brings to light the dilatory of 
interlocutory appeal to the substantive suit between parties. The action in this case 
was brought on the 29th day of April, 1987. The motion on notice to strike out the 
Case for want of jurisdiction is dated 15th day of April, 1988; that is about a year 
after the suit was filed. The ruling of the high court was delivered on the 20th day of 
June, 1988. The appeal against the ruling was delivered by the Court of Appeal on 
the 16th day of February, 1989. The final judgment on the interlocutory appeal is 
delivered today by this Court. It has thus taken thirteen years for the case to reach 
this stage. With the success of the Plaintiff’s appeal before us, the case is to be sent 
back to high court to be determined, hopefully, on its merits after a delay of 13 
years. Surely, this could have been avoided had it been that the point was taken in 
the course of proceedings in the substantive claim to enable any aggrieved party to 
appeal on both the issue of jurisdiction and the judgment on merit in the 
proceedings as the case might be. I believe that the counsel owe it, as a duty, to the 
court to help reduce the period of delay in determining the cases in our courts by 
avoiding unnecessary preliminary objections as the one here; so that the adage 
justice delayed is justice denied may cease to apply to the proceedings in our 
courts. 
His Lordship’s wise counsel has been embraced by our courts in subsequent 
decisions with the result that it has become the norm to argue preliminary objection 
along with substantive suit in cases especially cases commenced through 
originating summons.  
Mention must also be made of an innovative provision in the Federal High Court 
rules which stipulates that where a party intends to challenge the jurisdiction of the 
court, he must within days deliver the objection along with his response to the 
claim. And where the objection is not filed at the appropriate time, its hearing is 
postponed until final address. This provision aims at ensuring timely filing of 
preliminary objections by Defendants. It however does not foreclose the right of a 
party to still challenge the court’s jurisdiction to entertain a Suit at any time before 
judgment. The provision merely delays hearing of the objection until address stage. 
It also does not foreclose the right of the objector to raise objection on jurisdiction 
for the very first time in the Court of Appeal. Where the objection is upheld, 
proceedings in the trial court are nullities and liable to be set aside. When a 
plaintiff, applicant or petitioner approaches a court, he does so in the hope that his 
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grievances will be addressed by the court promptly and fairly. No plaintiff briefs a 
counsel in order to litigate jurisdictional issues from High Court to Court of Appeal 
and Supreme Court over a period of 10 years or more. The legitimate aspiration of 
a plaintiff who won a case in the High Court and Court of Appeal will not have 
been defeated if the fruits of successful litigation are denied by the Supreme 
Court’s decision which reverses the judgments of the High Court and Court of 
Appeal for want of jurisdiction to try the suit.  
Perhaps time has come to start thinking of the desirability of more than one High 
Court in the Nigerian judicial system which has one Court of Appeal and one 
Supreme Court. The need for a-rethink is more compelling bearing in mind the 
available pressure which judges of State High Courts are made to undergo by the 
Executive and Legislative arms of Government at the State level. When the issue is 
not about the composition or non-composition of panel of persons of integrity by 
the State Chief Judge to impeach a Governor or his Deputy, it will be who as 
between the National Judicial Council and the State Government should have the 
final word on the appointment of an acting Chief Judge of a State! From the point 
of view of independence of judiciary, there is need to insulate the judiciary from 
suspicion and politics. This point can be illustrated with the comment of Ray Ekpu 
(1983): 
When you take a cursory look at the battle of jurisdiction between Federal and 
State High Courts, you may think it is purely a matter of Law. But if you look more 
closely, you may convince yourself that it is a matter of politics. Federal officials 
and institutions that are arraigned before the State High Courts look at these Courts 
with suspicion. State officials and individuals who are taken to Federal Courts view 
these Courts with distrust because of political polarization of the country and 
attitude of some Judges. But why can’t someone in Benin hope to get Justice at the 
Federal High Court Lagos? Why Justice should be determined by geography or 
politics or geopolitics.  
Presently in criminal cases, the prosecuting agencies embark on forum shopping. 
Federal offences involving the funds of Federal Government that are allegedly 
stolen or obtained by false pretences are being tried by State High Courts because 
of the preference of the prosecutors for State High Courts. Defendants charged 
with offences in some State High Courts suspect State High Courts whose Judges 
they accuse of being unable to tower above politics and influence of politicians. 
These defendants resort to filing objections which challenge the jurisdiction of the 
State High Courts to try them. The existence of more than one High Court has 
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resulted in jurisdictional juggling between the two Courts. The victims of the 
juggling are the Plaintiffs, Claimants and in criminal cases, the Prosecution. They 
have been bearing and would continue to shoulder the cost of multiple High Court 
system. Speedy disposition of cases by specialist Courts and observance of Federal 
principles are the identified reasons for multiple High Court System. With the 
expanded jurisdiction of the Federal High Court under the 1999 Constitution, it is 
obvious that the objective for its establishment namely speedy disposal of cases 
involving Federal Government’s Revenue which the State High Court were unable 
to dispose with dispatch has been jettisoned. Today the Federal High Court has and 
exercises jurisdiction over general and special causes of action, by virtue of Section 
46 and 251 of the 1999 Constitution. The Federal High Court may not be a Court 
of general jurisdiction but is evidently, unlike the National Industrial Court, not a 
specialist Court on account of the added/expanded jurisdiction. The existence of a 
specialist BAR is another justification for multiple High Courts. Thirty one years 
after the establishment of the Federal High Court, we are yet to witness a specialist 
BAR. 
The Federalists argue in favour of dual High Court system against the need to 
observe Federal principles namely separate Federal and State Courts that will 
interpret and apply Federal and State Laws respectfully. However, a rigidly dual 
Federation will also enthrone dual Appellate System of Courts such that appeals 
from Federal Trial Courts will be determined by Federal Appeal Courts while 
appeals against State Trial Courts are to be determined by State Appeal Courts. 
This has not been the arrangement under the 1999 Constitution. Presently appeals 
from all trial Courts go to Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. There are no State 
Court of Appeal and State Supreme Court in Nigeria. The time has come to debate 
the desirability or otherwise of multiple High Courts in Nigeria. This paper is not 
advocating that the Federal High Court be abolished while State High Court and 
National Industrial Court are retained. A proposal for the merger of all trial courts 
to form a National High Court or High Court of the Federation should be seriously 
considered.  
The proposed National High Court or High Court of the Federation should have 
general jurisdiction over all Civil Causes and matters. The Court like the Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court should neither be Federal nor State High Court. It 
should be a Court established for the Federation. The Court would consequently 
not be the controlled by the Federal of State Government. A Central body similar 
to the National Judicial Council with more widespread representations should 
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control the affairs of the proposed National High Court. The Courts in each state of 
the Federation should functions as a division of the National High Court the way 
the Court of Appeal functions as a division in the various states where they are 
located where the need arises as many divisions as possible should be established 
in a state. In each state, there should be a presiding judge whose responsibilities 
will be similar to those assigned to Chief Judges of Federal and State High Courts. 
A presiding Judge need not be an indigene of the State where he presides. Judges 
and officials of State High Courts must be ready to accept postings outside their 
State of origin the way judges and officials of Federal High court serve outside 
their states of origin. There are others issues such as infrastructure and personnel 
which can be worked out.  
 
8. Conclusion  
The Federal High Court was established on 1973 as a revenue Court with limited 
original jurisdiction. More than 42 years after its establishment, there has been 
endless jurisdictional Juggling. Notwithstanding the jurisdictional conflicts, the 
present constitutional structure of three High Courts (Federal High Court, State 
High Court and National Industrial Court) is not without merits. The current 
system ensures that federal character is reflected in the appointment of judges of 
the Federal High Court and National Industrial Courts. Also, indigenes of a State 
appointed to the State Bench bring their knowledge of the workings of the State to 
bear on the judicial process particularly on evidential issues. However, there are 
also demerits to the present system of three High Courts. There is the problem of 
political pressure on judges by the State Government. There is also the problem of 
political suspicion and mutual distrust of the system by litigants and Legal 
Practitioners which necessitates the preference for litigating in one Court over 
another. In the process of forum shopping such a Plaintiff is likely to be confronted 
with jurisdictional hurdles. Time and expenses are wasted in the jurisdictional 
tussle. We are also likely to witness more jurisdictional juggling as a result of the 
expanded jurisdiction of the Court under the 1999 Constitution and the recognition 
of National Industrial Court as a High Court by the same 1999 Constitution. There 
is so much conflict over the jurisdiction of our Courts. The Supreme Court, as 
shown above, has not helped matters on account of its conflicting decisions on the 
various aspects of the Court’s jurisdiction. The existence of multiple High Courts 
and jurisdictional conflicts have added to cost of litigation and delayed Justice.  
JURIDICA 
 29 
The following questions are crucial in determining which way to go - How do we 
avoid jurisdictional conflicts? How do we insulate our Judges from politicians, 
political suspicion, manipulations and distrust? Would having one National High 
Court for the whole Country with Judicial Divisions in each State solve the 
problem? If it would solve the problem, how do we solve the administrative issues 
it is likely to generate? How do we guarantee that having one National High Court 
would ensure the independence of the Judiciary without interference from the 
Executive both at Federal and State level? Would one National High Court reduce 
costs and avoid jurisdictional conflicts? Have we not made a mistake by having 
more than one High Court?  
We will end this paper by adopting the views expressed by Street, (1978:437) thus: 
It is never too late to correct a mistake once the mistake is exposed and recognised. 
Justice is too precious an inheritance to be allowed to become a pawn in the power 
struggle between the common wealth and State.What I seek, is to protect and 
promote the only effective court system available to use in our Federal Nation.  
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